







The literature on lending to small firms has primarily focused on the mechanisms and 
methods used to evaluate entrepreneurs and businesses and on the types of firms that are 
more likely to experience unfavourable application outcomes. That is, the focus of most 
empirical research is on supply-side decisions. The current research attempts to shed 
some light on demand–side considerations. Drawing upon data collected as the UK 
SME Finance Monitor (2011-2014), we identify links between entrepreneurs’ diligence, 
business risk and finance-related advice-seeking prior to initiating loan and overdraft 
applications. The results show evidence of the usefulness of advice in ameliorating, both 
structural and strategic, business risk and improving the prospects of successful debt 
applications to banks. 
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Support for the creation and development of small firms is a central component of the 
industrial policies of most nations (Blackburn 2016)(Blackburn 2016). A central 
concern for policy in all countries has been with the difficulty SMEs may face in 
accessing bank loans (Beck et al. 2013; Canton et al. 2013). Due to relative information 
opacity, small firms represent riskier prospects to potential sources of finance (Berger & 
Udell 2003; Kirschenmann 2016; Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). For banks, as the primary 
source of external finance, asymmetric information manifests in a greater risk of moral 
hazard and higher agency costs of debt. The firm owner, who is typically also the 
manager and key decision maker, has an incentive to pursue riskier projects since the 
costs of these risks are disproportionately borne by the lender (Berger & Udell 2003; 
Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). Lending to small firms (and lending smaller amounts) carries 
disproportionately higher costs of due diligence (Treichel & Scott 2006); with these 
costs inflated in the face of limited credit histories or audited financial statements. 
Largely for these reasons, smaller firms have historically been identified as especially 
susceptible to credit rationing. 
However, through the use of different lending mechanisms, evidence suggests that 
banks and small firms manage to avoid credit rationing on a general basis (Berger & 
Black 2011; Kremp & Sevestre 2013; Parker 2002). The provision of collateral, the 
imposition of shorter maturity terms, the insertion of covenants, and the setting of 
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varying prices gives the tool to banks and entrepreneurs to reach terms of contract that 
are acceptable to both sides(Berger & Udell 2003; Peltoniemi & Vieru 2013). 
Nonetheless, while recognising that most small firm applicants are ultimately able to 
obtain debt financing (Vos et al. 2007; Cowling et al. 2012), there is some evidence of 
loan scaling
1
 or structural higher pricing faced by specific segments such as innovative 
and growing firms (Nitani & Riding 2013; Rostamkalaei & Freel 2016; Lee et al. 2014).  
One potential source of market failure results from consumers being poorly informed 
about the quality and prices of alternatives in the market before making decisions 
(Storey 2003). On the supply side, different lending technologies have been investigated 
and the potential effect of these methods on small firms have been discussed (Berger et 
al. 2005; Berger & Udell 2006; Berger & Black 2011). However, we are much less 
informed about the readiness of the entrepreneur to approach external financiers. An 
important part of successful lending processes depends on entrepreneurs’ decisions 
about when, where, and how to apply for external financing.  
An example of the effect of imperfect information on the demand-side is the case of 
“discouraged borrowers” (Kon & Storey 2003; Freel et al. 2010; Xiang et al. 2015). 
Discouraged borrowers do not apply for credit because they fear rejection – despite their 
declared neediness and despite being observationally indistinguishable from those who 
applied for and received money. There is also evidence that some entrepreneurs face 
                                                 
1
 In the current context, loan scaling is the practice of being offered some proportion of the funds 
requested, but less than the full amount. 
4 
 
initial rejection or are presented with unsuitable terms of contract at the first attempt and 
must re-apply, renegotiate, or switch banks for a better deal. For example, in the current 
data set, 40% and 25% of firms seeking loan and overdraft funding, respectively, report 
initial rejection or did not accept the initial terms of contract. Not being well informed 
about available alternatives and prices may lead entrepreneurs to avoid requesting 
external funds or increase the risks of initial rejection. In contrast, some applicants are 
likely to be more aware of potential information and resource gaps and, accordingly, 
will be better placed to make an ‘educated’ decision. In short, our concern is with how 
well the demand-side is informed about external financing before initiating the 
applications process. 
Our research draws upon this idea and investigates the role of business advisors in 
preparing small businesses to request external finance. We speculate that higher 
financial awareness on the part of the entrepreneur and a higher degree of business risk 
will both associate with a higher probability of understanding the knowledge gap and, 
accordingly, of seeking advice. Our paper seeks to study this group of bank clients and 
the effect of advisory services in ameliorating resource access pressures. If business 
advice reduces information and risk asymmetries, by allowing firms to better present 
themselves to banks, then firms may experience better initial outcomes than similar 
non-advice seeking firms. 
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Drawing on data from the UK SME Finance Monitor, our paper considers applicants for 
new bank facilities in the UK during 2011-2014. As segue to our main analyses, we 
begin by modelling the use of borrowing-specific business advice. That is, we explore 
what types of entrepreneurs identify (and act upon) a need for advice before applying 
for external finance. Following this, we investigate whether accessing business advice 
helps applicants get satisfactory results at their first attempt of approaching banks. We 
hypothesize that the riskiness of the business and the diligence of the entrepreneur are 
good indicators of the probability of seeking advice, and of the ability to successfully 
exploit advice. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the characteristics of firms 
or individuals that are linked with advice seeking behaviour. From this we develop our 
opening two hypotheses. Thereafter, it reviews evidence on the potential effect of 
advice on loan application success and in mitigating access to finance problems. From 
this we form our remaining two hypotheses. Section 3 outlines our data and econometric 
choices; section 4 elaborates our findings; and section 5 discusses the implications of 
our results for entrepreneurs and policy. 
Business advice and SMEs 
Decision makers rarely operate in isolation. Rather, they draw upon internal and 
external sources of information to analyze a situation and to draft a plan. Entrepreneurs, 
faced with a dynamic business environment and dense regulations, frequently recognise 
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the limits of their expertise. In such circumstances, entrepreneurs must search for 
additional information and expertise. Evidence on the use of advice by small firms 
suggests broad use of social networks, business networks, banks and accountants, 
private professional business services and publicly funded advisory services (McGee & 
Sawyerr 2003; Bennett & Robson 1999; Shaw & Bennett 1999). Crucially, advice is 
different from static sources of information such as reports, regulatory documents, and 
internet content. Advice entails an interactive and iterative process of exchanging 
information, involving the advice seeker and advice supplier (McGee & Sawyerr 2003). 
Advice is a recommendation (Bonaccio & Dalal 2006) or an influence (Harvey et al. 
2000) which is aimed at reducing complexity in the environment. The decision maker 
may utilize the advice or disregard it (wholly or in part), but in the process of 
exchanging information a new piece of knowledge or perspective is inevitably 
transferred. Through decreasing risk and complexity and adding knowledge resources, 
business advice may improve the prospects of small firms. The empirical evidence 
typically suggests a positive impact of business advice on small firms’ competitiveness 
(Chrisman & McMullan 2004; Chrisman et al. 2005; Bennett & Robson 2000; Robson 
& Bennett 2000). 
The ability to recognise missing information or the likelihood of having limited 
confidence in one’s decision-making are affected by the entrepreneur’s human capital 
(Scott & Irwin 2009; Han et al. 2012; Collis & Jarvis 2002; Johnson et al. 2007; 
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Larsson et al. 2003), the level of pre-advice confidence and the accuracy of past 
decisions (Yaniv 2004), perceptions of the complexity of the environment and of the 
current challenges (Dyer & Ross 2008; Trevelyan 2008). Accordingly, advice seeking 
behaviour and information search activity is influenced by individuals’ confidence in 
their decisions (Yaniv 2004). At opposite extremes, being highly knowledgeable or 
knowing too little may lead to individuals’ overconfidence about their skills and 
judgment (Bhandari & Deaves 2006). Forbes (2005)  demonstrates that 
‘comprehensiveness’ is associated with overconfidence in entrepreneurs. In this way, 
we may anticipate a U-shaped relationship between diligence and overconfidence such 
that the likelihood of being overconfidence initially decreases with diligence, but at very 
high levels of diligence (i.e. ‘comprehensiveness’) overconfidence may return. 
However, the comprehensiveness required is likely to be extensive and, in a mixed 
sample of small firms, unlikely to be frequently observed. Rather, we hypothesize that 
better informed and more diligent entrepreneurs are more capable of recognising 
uncertainty in lending markets and take preventative actions to avoid disappointment. 
That is, they are more likely to seek external advice before applying: 
Hypothesis 1a. Informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to seek advice for 
their financing needs. 
Entrepreneurs’ need for external advice is also influenced by the characteristics of their 
firms. For instance, the size and age of the business are frequently shown to affect the 
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probability and intensity of advice seeking (Boter & Lundström 2005; Dyer & Ross 
2008; Johnson et al. 2007; Robson et al. 2008; Mole et al. 2008). Both size and age may 
be thought to indicate relative ‘riskiness’. Although larger companies are likely to face 
more complex problems (Johnson et al. 2007), it is the resource constraints associated 
with smaller size that drives the “liability of smallness” (Aldrich & Auster 1986). In a 
similar vein, the related concept of the “liability of newness” is likely to explicate the 
relationship between age and advice seeking (Stinchcombe & March 1965). As 
businesses age, legitimacy improves, knowledge and resources are accumulated  and the 
need for ‘routine’ external advice diminishes (Bennett & Robson 2000). 
However, firm risk may be strategic as well as structural. Irrespective of age and size 
considerations, firms adopting specific strategies may face increased risk and 
uncertainty. Riskier strategies increase perceived environmental uncertainty and, from 
the perspective of potential funders, information opacity. Entrepreneurs, in turn, must 
increase their efforts towards environmental screening (McGee & Sawyerr 2003; Dyer 
& Ross 2008). Higher perceived risk is reflected in the behaviour of entrepreneurs. For 
example, innovative firms are more likely to recognise the need to contact external 
sources of information to reduce uncertainty (Johnson et al. 2007; Bennett & Robson 
2000). In a similar manner, exporting, as a method of expansion and growth, also 
increases the complexity of operations and uncertainty (Bennett & Robson 2000; 
Johnson et al. 2007). Moreover, growth history may also affect the propensity to seek 
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advice (Bennett & Robson 2000). Growing firms, recognising their higher risk, are 
likely to perceive of a higher level of difficulty in accessing external financial (Binks & 
Ennew 1996; Westhead & Storey 1997). Indeed, this financing difficulty for higher risk 
firm may not only be a perception. Recent empirical studies have provided evidence of 
loan scaling (Freel 2007) or higher pricing (Nitani & Riding 2013) toward innovative 
and growing firms. Following this, we hypothesise that increased risk, associated with 
both structural and strategic factors, reduces entrepreneur’s confidence in obtaining 
external finance, and therefore: 
Hypothesis 1b. Entrepreneurs whose firms exhibit a higher degree of risk are more 
likely to seek external sources of information before approaching banks. 
Beyond use, measuring the effectiveness of advice and soft support is difficult. Advice 
is a perishable and intangible good (Bennett & Robson 1999). Moreover, observing how 
the advice seeker reacts to the advice is not straightforward. Advisees assess the quality 
of the given advice based on their perceptions. They weigh the advice against their 
initial intentions (Bonaccio & Dalal 2006; Yaniv 2004). They utilize it, or discard it. 
Indeed, individuals may show reluctance to follow advice even when they know it is 
true and it is free (Harvey & Fischer 1997). Nevertheless, in the process of exchanging 
information, the typical advisee receives reassuring information about their decision 
(Ramsden & Bennett 2005). Studies frequently show that entrepreneurs see positive 
effects from advice and can link the advice to better performance (Bennett & Robson 
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2000; Berry et al. 2006; Boter & Lundström 2005; Scott & Irwin 2009). Evidence 
indicates that business advice may help small firms to survive or grow (Wren & Storey 
2002; Chrisman & McMullan 2000). Broadly speaking, taking up advice has been 
shown to benefit advice seekers (Harvey & Fischer 1997). Advice, even poor quality 
advice, is thought to decrease complexity (McGee & Sawyerr 2003) and error variance 
(Harvey & Fischer 1997). Both discounting and utilising advice are related to the 
entrepreneurs’ confidence in their knowledge and reasoning. Better informed 
individuals are more capable of analyzing the information they receive. We speculate 
that more informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to realize the value of the 
advice they are offered and utilize or discard it effectively. Accordingly, we hypothesise 
that: 
Hypothesis 2a: More informed and diligent entrepreneurs are more likely to benefit 
from external advice; with the benefits manifest in a successful financial application. 
With respect to the efficacy of the advice in reducing risk; using external advice is 
likely to lower the perceived level of complexity (Ramsden & Bennett 2005) and 
increases the entrepreneur’s post-advice confidence (Dyer & Ross 2008). Accordingly, 
we hypothesize that the advice sought specifically for external financing will help 
entrepreneurs reduce the uncertainty associated with their firm and increase the chances 
of favourable outcome: 
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Hypothesis 2b. Entrepreneurs with higher risk profiles are more likely to benefit from 
external advice when applying for external financing.  
Seeking advice, valuing, utilizing, or discarding it are not solely dependent upon the 
decision maker. Rather, it is also affected by structure and the size of the advice market, 
types of task, rewards system, quality of advice, and trust and power distance between 
advisees and advisors ( Bennett & Robson 2000; Berry et al. 2006; Gooderham et al. 
2004; Larsson et al. 2003; Mole 2002; Harvey et al. 2000; Mole & Bramley 2006). Due 
to data limitations, our study cannot investigate the structure of advice taking-giving 
systems. Rather we are constrained to focus solely on the entrepreneur. In our study, 
sources of advice are treated as homogenous. However, we construct an objective index 
to measure the effectiveness of advice. We call an application a ‘success’ if the 
application is new and if funds are offered by the bank and accepted by the entrepreneur 
at the first attempt - before the entrepreneur and the bank engage in re-negotiating, 
reduce the amount, or the entrepreneur switches banks. We believe that this measure 
can help us to understand whether seeking advice can save time and resources and 
prevent unnecessary stress to the entrepreneur.  
Data and methodology 
The data used in this paper is the series of cross-section surveys comprising the Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor (2011-2014) accessed from UK Data 





. In each wave, 5000 telephone interviews were conducted on a broad range of 
issues related to small firm finance. The respondents to the questionnaire were the 
persons in charge of making financial decisions within sample firms.  Sample 
businesses are for-profit, non-governmental and independent, with less than 250 
employees and less than £25 Million prior year sales turnover. The screening criteria 
remained the same during all waves of data collection. The sample is drawn from Dun 
and Bradstreet and Experian and captures a wide range of businesses across different 
sectors, sizes, ages, external risk ratings, and locations. In addition, the data provides 
information on business performance and strategy, planning, and human resource 
policies. Compared with the UK business population statistics, the dataset is over-
sampled toward larger firms (BDRC Continental 2015); therefore, analysis without 
weights would be biased towards those firms.  
In our analysis, we used the probability sample weight calculated by BDRC Continental 
from the first quarter of 2012 to second quarter of 2014. The data, and sampling weight, 
is provided on a 10 waves rolling basis. The weighting is calculated based on population 
figures for SMEs across numbers of employees, business sectors, 12 NUTS1 regions, 
and start-ups (see BDRC Continental, 2015). The total sample size is more than 50,000 
observations, which represents more than 4.5 million businesses within the UK. All the 
presented analyses and statistics in our paper are weighted, unless otherwise stated. 
                                                 
2
 The last quarter conducted but not published by this date is second quarter of 2015. 
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Given the large size of the dataset, we speculate that there is limited risk of cross 
sampling. Moreover, if a firm appears more than once in the dataset, as a loan applicant 
and overdraft applicant in the same year, they are treated as a single firm with identical 
covariates across independent and control variables.  
We divided our sample on the basis of overdraft and loan requests separately. The 
reasons for requesting each type of facility are likely to differ: overdrafts, trade credit 
and lines of credit are mainly used to address working capital needs, whereas longer 
term loans are typically requested for the purchase of premises and equipment (Berger 
& Udell 2003). In the unweighted sample, there were 2401 and 4572 firms that applied 
for, respectively, term loans and overdrafts and, in turn, 25% and 13% of these 
applicants sought advice prior to application. It appears that entrepreneurs perceive 
greater challenges when they decide to apply for term loans. The survey studied the 
demand for external financing in the 12 months preceding each wave of the survey. The 
survey explicitly asks, only from new applicants, whether the entrepreneur has sought 
external advice before applying for her new loan or overdraft facility
3
. This gave us the 
opportunity to investigate the characteristics of those managers who look for bank-
related application advice, not general advice. We did not include firms who were asked 
by banks to re-negotiate the terms of contract, cancel an existing facility, lower or 
increase a loan or overdraft amount, since the decision to approach the banks was not 
                                                 
3
 The text of the question reads: “Did you seek any external advice before applying for your 
overdraft/loan facility?”  
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initiated by the entrepreneur. In addition, in the case of existing facilities, both sides are 
likely to be better informed about the condition of the facility and its riskiness.  
Consequently, we prepared two different sub-samples: Loan applicants and overdraft 
applicants. Since the sample only deals with new applications, the problem of selection 
bias might exist (we do not observe how non-applicants and banks would behave should 
the entrepreneurs decided to apply for a facility). To control for selection bias, we hoped 
to estimate a two-stage Heckman procedure, modelling financial neediness in the first 
stage. However, from the variables available, it was not possible to meet the exclusion 
criteria. There are some questions which explore the reasons for seeking finance, 
however, those questions were only asked of applicants and cannot be used in a two 
stage analysis. With this in mind, we are cautious in not extending our findings to non-
applicants. 
To test hypothesis 1a and 1b, we model the probability of seeking advice prior to 
requesting external finance as a function of characteristics of the entrepreneur and 
potential sources of application risk alongside with a set of control variables. To 
investigate the effect of advice in mitigating risk, ideally we would like to employ 
advice-taking as an independent variable and assess its significance in explaining the 
probability of obtaining credit. However, since many of the variables hypothesized to 
influence advice seeking behaviour are also likely to bear on application success, this 
approach raises conceptual and empirical challenges. To overcome this challenge, one 
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might seek to replace advice-seeking with its instrument. However, as is frequently the 
case in research of this kind, finding suitable instruments was not possible
4
. 
Accordingly, we chose to split the sample further and regress the probability of 
successful application for advice seekers and their counterparts separately. This allows 
us to compare the variables that improve or diminish the probability of application 
success for firms seeking advice and non-seekers of advice
5
.  
 Dependent variables 
In the first stage of our analysis, identifying the characteristics of advice seekers, we 
used a dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur sought external advice prior to 
applying for bank finance. As indicated, some applicants were referred to sources of 
advice by banks after initial rejection. We do not include these applicants as they 
approached external sources of advice to satisfy their banks, not to identify any potential 
gap proactively. This operationalisation of advice-seeking remained the same over all 
analyses.   
For the dependent variable used in the second stage of our analysis, we employed a 
specific definition for application success. We consider an application successful if the 
bank and entrepreneur agree on a contract at the first attempt. This allows us to consider 
                                                 
4
 The pitfalls of using mis-specified two-stage models and invalid or weak instrument are explained by 
Puhani (2000) and Murray (2006) . 
5
 We also tested for multicollinearity problem by calculating Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). None of the 
variables showed VIFs greater than 10.  
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the effect of advice seeking prior to approaching banks and to control for the effect of 
appealing, renegotiating, re-applying, or switching banks. For this reason, our rate of 
successful application is lower than the ultimate success rate (unweighted, 62% and 
75% success rate for, respectively, loan and overdraft based on our definition; and 80% 
and 88% for ultimate success defined by the survey conductor). To test the hypotheses, 
we estimate Probit regression models, since our dependent variables are binary. 
Independent variables 
Our study investigates the effect of perceived knowledge gaps and business risk on 
advice seeking behaviour and on the usefulness of advice sought. We incorporated 
different measures to proxy these two elements. Firstly, we hypothesize that diligent 
entrepreneurs are more likely to recognise knowledge gaps, seek external advice (H1a) 
and use the advice effectively (H2a). It seems clear that entrepreneurs require some 
degree of absorptive capacity to realize the benefits of advice (Gooderham et al. 2004). 
To measure diligence, we first consider financial training. We speculate that training in 
financial management helps entrepreneurs understand external financing requirements 
and take the necessary steps to meet those requirements. Beyond this, we conjecture that 
if the long term plan of the business is clear, the entrepreneur is more likely to know the 
resources needed for development and act to acquire these. In line with this idea, we 
also use a dummy variable indicating the production of regular accounting reports. 
Generating systematic accounting information should help the owner identify sources of 
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risk and to take the necessary steps to mitigate these. Periodic reporting is the most used 
indicator of the financial wellbeing of entrepreneurs and often signals a good 
relationship with lenders (Collis & Jarvis 2002).   
Our second concern is with the effect of potential business risk on the propensity to seek 
advice (H1b) and on the effectiveness of advice in mitigating risk (H2b). In the first 
instance, we use innovation as an indicator of riskiness. Innovation is an essentially 
speculative strategy, with innovative firms committing resources to an uncertain 
outcome. Past research on the financing of innovative small firms has shown them to be 
less successful in loan markets relative to their less innovative peers (Freel 2007). As 
Mina and colleagues note (2013, p. 894), “uncertain innovation activities negatively 
affect the supply of finance, in line with the expectation that businesses undertaking 
risky projects will incur higher external costs of capital and will have access to 
suboptimal levels of financial resources”. In our analysis, a firm is innovative if they 
declared they developed a new product or service and/or significantly improved an 
aspect of the business in the three years prior to the survey. 
 
Our second indicator of potential business risk is exporting. In the face of imperfect 
access to information, foreign market entry becomes a particularly risky and uncertain 
undertaking (Bennett & Robson 2000; Hessels & Terjesen 2010)(Bennett & Robson 
2000; Hessels & Terjesen 2010). We identify a firm as an exporter if they declare that 
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they sell products or services outside of the UK. Ideally, we would also like to capture 
the effect of firm growth on perceived riskiness (see, for example, Rostamkalaei & 
Freel 2016). Indeed, data on the growth history of firms were available to us; however, 
the data were highly collinear with business age. That is, the majority of firms which 
experience substantial growth in sale turnover were the youngest ones. Accordingly, we 
only include the age of the business in our models. 
 
We also proxy business risk by firm size and age: reasoning that older and larger firms 
have improved access to resources, which lower their risk profiles. In addition, we 
expect younger, less experienced firms (and their entrepreneurs) to have accumulated 
less knowledge; therefore, they are expected to be more likely to perceive higher risks 
with their applications. Firm size is measured by number of employees and firm age by 
the years since business establishment. Both variables are measured categorically.  
Our next measures relate to the relationship of the applicants with their banks. It has 
long been argued that established relationships between banks and their customers 
provide the basis for the exchange and accumulation of better quality data about 
entrepreneurs and the prospects of their businesses; leading to a decrease in the 
information asymmetry that is thought to mark small firm-bank relationships (Binks & 
Ennew 1996). In this way, relational banking may increase small firms’ access to bank 
facilities or, at least, lead to better terms of contract. For instance, in a study of the 
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effect of bank provided business advice on the financial condition of small firms, Han et 
al (2012) found that better relationships with banks lowered the entrepreneur’s 
perceptions of difficulties in accessing finance. In line with this, we speculate that 
applying to a firm’s main bank will lower perceived risk for both the entrepreneur and 
the bank. However, we observe that almost all overdraft applicants applied to their main 
banks (table 1). For this reason, we excluded this variable from our overdraft 
applications estimations. In addition, we are able to identify first time applicants. This 
group are expected to know less about the application procedures and banks’ lending 
criteria, and are more likely to seek advice prior to applying. We also control for the 
amount of facility sought; with the expectation that larger amounts signal more risk to 
both banks and entrepreneurs.  
In evaluating the effectiveness of advice, we add one additional variable. For both term 
loans and overdrafts, we identify the reason(s) why the money was requested. We 
speculate that the reasons funds are sought may affect application outcome. For 
example, if the loan is sought to purchase assets, the risk taken on by the bank would be 
lower than a situation where the funds are sought to support firm growth. In the former 
case, firms can pledge the purchased asset to insure the loan; in the latter, money is used 
to fund a risky activity with an uncertain outcome. 
Relatedly, in assessing the riskiness of the business, the ability of firms to provide 
collateral to partially insure the loan and reduce moral hazard has been widely discussed 
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in the literature (e.g. Berger & Udell 1998; Parker 2002). Ideally, we would hope to 
include some measure of the firm’s ability to pledge collateral, such as firm’s assets or 
entrepreneur’s personal wealth. Unfortunately, this information was not available. We 
hope to capture some effect of asset availability by controlling for industry and business 
age. 
Control variables 
In order to estimate the unique effects of diligence and riskiness on the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs and banks, it is important to account for other possible influences on 
advice-seeking behaviour and application success. To this end, we include a number of 
control variables in our models. Firstly, we include a variable that indicates the location 
of the firm, since the density and quality of advisory services may differ and past 
research has shown that small firms typically use local providers for business advice 
(Bennett et al. 2000). The variable takes the form of a categorical variable that records 
whether firms were located in the dominant economies of London or the Southeast of 
the UK, with the rest of the UK acting as a reference group. We also include industry 
sector, since the objective and perceived risk of businesses may differ across different 
sectors (Michelacci & Schivardi 2013). Moreover, some industries may draw upon their 
networks more for gathering external information. In addition, we incorporate a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the business is mainly run by a woman (i.e. more than 50% of the 
firm belongs to a woman). Gender is a ‘usual suspect’ in studies concerned with small 
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firms and their banks (e.g. Orser et al. 2006) and advice seeking (Mole et al. 2008). We 
control for the legal status of the business on the grounds that the number of proprietors 
may influence the need to seek external advice and the likelihood of application success 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006). Finally, since the survey was conducted after the credit 
crunch of 2008 and the subsequent ‘healing’ period (Cowling et al. 2012), we do not 
expect the perceived riskiness of the businesses would differ across 2011-2014. 
However, as Cowling, Liu, and Ledger (2012, p.796) note, “For banks and small 
businesses, the way they react to a recessionary environment is quite different and not 
synchronised”. Accordingly, we control for the year in which each wave of the survey 
was conducted to account for the potential psychic effect of the credit crunch – viz. 
banks scaling down available credit and small businesses’ reluctance to approach banks.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest used in our analysis. 
The data in the table are weighted. Accordingly, the bias towards larger firms, present in 
the unweighted data, is not apparent here. More than half of the firms in the weighted 
sample are zero-employees businesses. While 74% of small firms in the UK are zero-
employee firms, only 20% of these firms were considered in the sampling protocol 
(BDRC Continental 2014). This difference illustrates why it is important to consider 
sampling weight in our analysis. Beyond size, 22% and 17% of loan and overdraft 
applicants were less than two years old. These figures approach the 20% estimation 
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reported by the survey conductor for the share of start-ups in UK small businesses 
population.  
TABLE1 
In the case of both loan and overdraft applicants, 50% of firms use regular accounting 
reports and more than 40% have formal business plans. Further, around 30% of 
entrepreneurs have been trained to manage their business’ financial tasks. In terms of 
innovators and exporters, given the definitions employed, half the sample report being 
innovators, whereas only 1 in 10 report exporting.  
Results 
Advice Seeking 
Turning to our main results, Table 2 reports the results of our first stage analysis – 
weighted Probit models estimating the probability of bank-specific advice seeking 
behaviour among loan and overdraft applicants. In the first instance, we hypothesised 
that better informed firms (proxied by regular financial reporting, formal business 
planning and financial training) would be more likely to seek advice prior to 
approaching banks for funds. In the loan panel, only formal business planning is 
associated with the increased probability of advice seeking. However, for overdraft 
funding, preparing regular accounting reports and the presence of a formal business plan 
both increase the probability of advice seeking. We take these results to partially 
confirm hypothesis 1a; which speculated that more diligent entrepreneurs would be 
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more likely to perceive information/resource gaps and seek advice before requesting 
external finance. To rephrase, among applicants to banks, those entrepreneurs who show 
some degree of professionalism through regular accounting reports and preparing 
business plan are more likely to realize a gap between what they know and what they 
need to know before completing a bank application.  
TABLE2 
Hypothesis 1b held that riskier firms would be more likely to seek advice – with 
riskiness measured by exporting and innovation activities; by the age and size of the 
business; by applications to other than the firm’s main bank; by first time applications; 
and by the amount of funds requested. Our results suggest that innovative firms were 
more likely to seek advice prior to approaching banks for both term loans and overdraft 
funding. Exporting also positively associates with the probability of advice-seeking 
prior to applications for overdraft funding. We interpret these findings to show that 
entrepreneurs pursuing riskier strategies appreciate the greater risk to banks and 
increase their information-seeking/uncertainty-reducing efforts. Similarly, the 
coefficients on business age categories for both loan and overdraft applications indicate 
that as firms age, the probability of seeking external advice fall. In the same vein, as 
firms get larger, they are likely to accumulate more tangible and intangible assets and 
build relationship with their banks, such that they perceive fewer knowledge gaps and 
less risk with respect to bank finance. In this way, we expected firm size to be 
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negatively associated with the probability of advice-seeking. Our results, however, only 
provide partial support: For overdraft applications, firms with more than 50 employees 
are less likely to seek finance advice than zero employee firms.  
Continuing with the hypothesised influence of perceived riskiness on advice-seeking 
behaviour; the amount of facility sought is also a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of advice-seeking. For both loan and overdraft applicants, as the amount of requested 
facility increases, the entrepreneur’s likelihood of engaging with external sources of 
information and advice increases. In general, these results support hypothesis 1b in 
indicating that riskier firms were more likely to seek advice prior to approaching banks 
for finance; with this holding for a broad array of indicators of risk. 
Benefits of Advice 
Turning to the second stage of our analysis: Table 3 displays the results of weighted 
Probit models of the probability of successful loan and overdraft applications for advice 
seekers and non-seekers. As mentioned, our definition of successful application is 
different from ultimate success in securing external funding. If bank and entrepreneur 
agree on terms of contract at the first attempt, we call that application a successful one. 
Considering the variables that are used to indicate the entrepreneur’s diligence, the data 
provide no support for hypothesis 2a. Indeed, some results appear contrary to our 
speculations. For example, taking advice decreases the probability of accessing 
overdraft funding for applicants with financial training. It also decreases the probability 
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of access to loans for applicants who generate regular accounting reports, while this 
measure has a positive influence on application success in the non-advice seeking 
group. The only positive significant effect of advice exists for overdraft applicants who 
had a business plan. These counter-intuitive results are certainly intriguing. One 
possible explanation might relate to the effect of advice in increasing the confidence of 
entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, confident entrepreneurs, with additional 
knowledge, are less likely to accept the bank’s initial offer and more likely to engage in 
negotiation (in which case they would be erroneously classed as ‘unsuccessful’ here). If 
we use final funding outcomes as a measure of success, the negative effect of regular 
accounting reports does not exist. It is also possible that, while more diligent 
entrepreneurs are in a better position to realize the riskiness of their business and to seek 
advice, ultimately the advice cannot wholly ameliorate the risks involved. Whilst it is 
useful to speculate, these relationships would appear to warrant further research. 
TABLE3 
Turning to measures of risk and hypothesis 2b, we find no evidence that exporting is a 
significant variable in explaining the probability of successful applications in both 
advice-seeking and non-seeking models. On the other hand, the negative effect of 
innovation on application success is absent from advice-seeking models and, indeed, is 
positively associated with successful loan applications. In both types of application, 
advice-seeking (and taking) benefits innovative firms. 
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Our results also suggest that advice-seeking reduces the negative effects of smaller size 
and younger age on application success. For both overdraft and loan applications in the 
non-advice seeking group, size and age of the business are significant factors in 
explaining the probability of successful application. As one would expect, smaller and 
younger firms occupy unfavourable positions in lending markets in comparison to their 
better resourced and experienced counterparts. However, in our advice-seeking group, 
age is no longer a significant predictor of success. In a similar way, advice seeking 
seems to mitigate the liability of smallness when applying for overdraft funds – 
although the effect on loan applications is only partial: In loan applications, the negative 
effect of size on smaller firms is removed relative to firms with 1 to 10 employees. 
However, firms with more than 10 employees are still more likely to achieve a 
successful outcome than zero-employee firms. In general, advice helps to remove the 
positive significant effect of age and size in applications for bank finance. Advice taking 
may have an important role to play in bridging the knowledge gaps of micro firms and 
start-ups and help them overcome ‘liabilities’ associated with newness and smallness. 
Moreover, as anticipated, loan applicants are significantly less likely to enjoy initial 
application success when they apply exclusively to their main banks. However, this 
effect turns positive when applicants seek advice beforehand. It seems that advice may 
increase the entrepreneur’s knowledge of credit markets and, in consequence, their 
confidence in their ability to secure a loan from their main bank. Advice taking also 
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increases the chance of a successful application for larger loans. In the advice-seeking 
group, larger applications have a better chance of being successful. In the non-advice 
seeking group, the size of the facility is not associated with success. Finally, in the case 
of overdraft applications, first time applicants are significantly less likely to be 
successful; and advice-seeking does not alter this observed relationship. 
Taken together, we interpret the results to indicate support for hypothesis b2. That is, to 
the extent that advice-seeking ameliorates the risks associated with innovativeness, age, 
size and single sourcing, it improves the prospects of small firms. This is also in line 
with the reported association between use of advice and lower level of perceived 
difficulty in raising external finance (Scott & Irwin 2009).  
To summarize both stages of analysis; we find some evidence that more diligent 
entrepreneurs are more likely to seek external advice when they decide to apply for 
bank facilities. However, they are not more likely to benefit from the advice sought in 
terms of improved chances of application success. Of course, this need not be 
interpreted as ‘no effect’. Rather, advice-seeking could result in increased knowledge 
and confidence and an unwillingness to accept the first offer. Unfortunately, our data 
does not allow us to explore this further and we are constrained to simply note the 
absence of an association with initial funding outcomes. 
On the risk measures, we find that innovative firms are more likely to seek advice when 
the entrepreneur decides to apply for a bank loan and to benefit from the advice sought. 
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Advice also improves the prospects of firms applying solely to their main banks. We 
speculate that this revolves around removing the negative effect of information 
restricted by the main bank and increasing the chance of successful application. Our 
strongest findings, however, relate to the effect of advice in attenuating difficulties in 
obtaining bank facilities for newer firms and, to lesser degree, smaller firms. Younger 
firms across all models were shown to be the main consumers of pre-application advice 
and to benefit from the advice sought. In other words, newer and smaller firms that have 
accessed external advice appear to be more ‘debt ready’ than their counterparts who 
eschew advice. They are able to obtain what they need in shorter time, with less physic 
pressure, allowing the entrepreneur to spend more of their limited time and energy on 
developing the early stage firm.   
 Concluding Remarks 
To date, the literature on small firms and their banks has been dominated by concerns 
with funding outcomes, with some limited work on supply-side lending technologies 
(Cowling et al. 2012; Berger & Black 2011).  The former often models application 
success as a function of a vector of firm and/or entrepreneur characteristics; to identify 
turn down rates or, more recently, adverse loan conditions among specific sub-sets of 
small firms (e.g. innovative, growing or exporting firms) or entrepreneurs (e.g. firms 
owned by women or visible minorities). This approach treats firms as islands of 
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decision-making, which sits ill with longstanding evidence on the extensive use of 
external sources of advice by small firms (Bennett & Robson 1999). 
 
Although small firms may be susceptible to credit rationing, this phenomenon is less 
likely to exist in the long run when the finance market for small firms is in equilibrium: 
i.e. there is a price at which the supply and demand for credit are equal. However, the 
price mechanism works under several conditions. For small firms “the key assumptions 
most likely to be contravened are those of perfect information and the absence of 
externalities” (Storey 2003, p.476). Imperfect information can give rise to perceived 
riskiness and leads to risk overestimation. Although there is limited evidence of broad-
based credit rationing, with turndown rates historically low, there is some evidence that 
particular groups of small firms fare less well (e.g. the very young and small, innovative 
firms and growing firms). These groups are thought to be ‘riskier’. And, since many of 
the sources of risk are thought to be intractable, the typical response is to call for 
supply-side interventions. For example, policies such as Loan Guarantee Schemes 
(LGS) reduce the objective risk to the lender by transferring much of the default risk to 
the government, encouraging the lender to fund projects which are not likely to secure 
debt without government intervention. 
However, a focus on supply-side interventions appears to ignore the possibility that the 
risk involved is a combination of both objective and subjective risk. The former may 
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well be intractable (and amenable only to transference), but the latter is surely not. 
Rather, it is likely to be a function of information-asymmetries and may well be 
responsive to demand-side actions. One example of such effort is the “investment 
readiness” initiatives in the UK, which aim to prepare firms for equity financing (Mason 
& Harrison 2001). There may also exist scope for better equipping small firms for 
lending markets (Freel 2007). These efforts may help small, high-risk firms to reduce 
their perceived riskiness and increase their chance of accessing debt with less effort, in 
shorter time, and on more favourable terms.  
In the current study, we are interested in the extent to which a particular form of 
demand-side action – advice seeking – acts to reduce identified liabilities in loan and 
overdraft applications to improve the prospects of small firms. Encouraging SMEs to 
access external advice has been a central plank of enterprise policy in most developed 
economies (Cumming & Fischer 2012). In the UK, for instance, the government has 
sponsored the creation of a “mentoring gateway” (www.mentorsme.com), which seeks 
to link entrepreneurs with potential sources of advice in the public and private sectors. 
Outside of the UK, McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016, p. 546), in their review of 
European enterprise policy, suggest that for “small and micro-enterprises, in particular, 
basic business advice may be the single most cost-effective form of support”.  However, 
the advice offered under the ambit of enterprise policy is typically not specific to bank 
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finance and, where it touches on financing at all, it is explicitly concerned with 
“investment readiness” (e.g. Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011, 7). 
Drawing upon data from the UK SME Finance Monitor (BDRC Continental 2014), we 
investigate the link between borrowing-specific business advice and loan application 
success. Initially, we explore the extent to which diligence and risk associate with 
advice-seeking. In both cases, we observe that more diligent entrepreneurs and those 
leading riskier businesses are more likely to seek advice. 
Thereafter, we speculate that the benefits of advice-seeking will be greatest among 
diligent and risky businesses. Our results do not support the former; but strongly 
support the later. The prospects of innovative, new and micro firms are enhanced 
following lending-specific advice. The results suggest that demand-side efforts aimed at 
alleviating risk may be fruitful. In other words, advice-taking for the purpose of external 
financing may mitigate the ‘liability of smallness and newness’ and liabilities associated 
with innovativeness. 
Additional evidence of the positive impact of advice is important. A UK report (BMG 
Research 2011), exploring barriers to the take up and use of business advice, noted that 
“[w]ith regards to the various categories of market failure, doubts about the benefits 
and value of assistance in relation to its cost appeared to be the most common form of 
market failure” (p. 71). This echoes Storey’s (Storey 2003) earlier assertion that 
“[s]mall business owners do not realise the private benefits of obtaining expert advice 
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from "outside" specialists”. That our results suggest a positive impact of advice on bank 
financing provides practical guidance to entrepreneurs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (weighted) – as percentage of loan or overdraft applicants 
 Loan Overdraft  Loan Overdraft 
Advice seekers 20% 10%    
Successful 
application 





30% 28% Age of Business   
Business plan 47% 42% start-up 22% 17% 
Accounting 51% 50% 2-5 yrs 22% 22% 
exporter 11% 10% 6-10 yrs 27% 28% 
Innovation 50% 50% >15 yrs 29% 33% 
first time 
applicant 
46% 29% Size   
Amount of 
facility 
  Zero employees 59% 57% 
    Less than 
10k 
41% 62% 1-9 employees 34% 37% 
    10K-100K 44% 32% 10-49 employees 6% 6% 
    >100k 15% 6% >50 employees 1% 1% 
Table does not include data on control variables: Gender, Location, Sector, Legal 





Table 2. Weighted Probit model for the effects of diligence and risk on the probability 
of advice seeking 
 Loan Overdraft 
DV Advice sought=1 Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Financial training (yes==1) 0.124 0.154 0.154 0.114 
Business Plan (yes==1) 0.314** 0.135 0.271** 0.118 
Regular accounting reports 
(yes==1) 0.0768 0.145 0.414*** 0.144 
Export (yes==1) 0.269 0.227 0.234** 0.115 
Innovation (yes==1) 0.345** 0.139 0.00513 0.113 
First time applicant (yes==1) -0.0461 0.141 0.281** 0.135 
Application to main bank (yes==1) -0.0115 0.204   
Amount sought (ref: <10k)     
   10-100K 0.367** 0.164 0.151 0.115 
   >100 K 1.122*** 0.184 0.414** 0.164 
business age (ref: start-ups)         
   2-5 yrs -0.225 0.201 -0.259 0.181 
   6-15 yrs -0.813*** 0.221 -0.269 0.181 
   >15 yrs -0.506** 0.221 -0.538*** 0.178 
Size (ref: 0 employees)         
   1-9 emps 0.196 0.158 -0.0324 0.138 
   10-49 emps 0.00966 0.215 -0.0152 0.174 
   >50 emps -0.252 0.261 -0.380* 0.214 
Business run by female 0.337** 0.151 0.0343 0.11 
Location (ref=rest of the UK)         
    London 0.234 0.21 -0.173 0.132 
   South East 0.0666 0.184 0.00858 0.156 
Sector(ref=community and personal 
services)         
   Agriculture 0.142 0.244 0.406** 0.194 
   Manufacturing -0.0456 0.305 0.117 0.234 
   Construction -0.0156 0.256 0.147 0.204 
   Services 0.143 0.218 0.00853 0.176 
   Real Estate 0.0857 0.24 0.249 0.184 
Legal (sole proprietorships==1) 0.258 0.164 -0.364*** 0.14 
Wave (ref==2011)         
  2012 -0.233 0.165 -0.109 0.137 
  2013 -0.0768 0.193 -0.0187 0.144 
  2014 -0.00959 0.352 0.0676 0.231 
Constant -1.624*** 0.343 -1.452*** 0.291 
Observations 1759  3955  
p-value 0  0  
Summer's D 66%  74%  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
35 
 
Table 3. Weighted Probit model for the effects of advice on the probability of successful 
application 
 Loan Overdraft 
  No Advice Advice No advice Advice 
DV Successful 
application=1 
Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Financial training -0.050 0.16 -0.103 0.243 0.048 0.115 -0.540** 0.245 
Business Plan -0.118 0.154 -0.077 0.284 -0.215** 0.109 -0.0785 0.237 
Regular accounting 
reports 
0.291* 0.164 -0.72*** 0.27 0.181 0.158 0.108 0.267 
Export 0.15 0.271 0.018 0.314 0.0122 0.103 -0.175 0.255 
Innovation -0.313* 0.165 0.456* 0.273 -0.226** 0.106 0.0079 0.239 
First time applicant 
(yes==1) 
-0.27 0.165 0.121 0.266 -0.99*** 0.122 -0.664** 0.294 
Application to main bank 
(yes==1) 
-0.526** 0.243 0.934*** 0.36         
Money for daily cash 
purposes 
     -0.043 0.171 0.322 0.328 
Money for asset 
purchasing 
-0.116 0.161 -0.179 0.264         
Money for funding growth -0.185 0.169 -0.64*** 0.236         
Amount sought (ref: <10k)                 
   10-100K -0.144 0.169 0.238 0.357 0.00769 0.112 0.033 0.29 
   >100 K -0.187 0.204 0.729* 0.381 0.124 0.186 0.0299 0.349 
business age (ref: start-
ups) 
                
   2-5 yrs 0.203 0.248 0.457 0.373 0.365** 0.175 -0.0225 0.36 
   6-15 yrs 0.197 0.244 0.167 0.426 0.550*** 0.177 0.232 0.384 
   >15 yrs 0.551** 0.244 0.279 0.443 0.599*** 0.186 0.39 0.393 
Size (ref: 0 employees)                 
   1-9 emps 0.296* 0.16 0.025 0.319 0.108 0.116 -0.411 0.299 
   10-49 emps 0.656*** 0.219 0.660* 0.356 0.448*** 0.152 -0.373 0.336 
   >50 emps 1.016*** 0.292 1.110** 0.429 0.619*** 0.211 0.605 0.422 
Business run by female -0.0107 0.178 0.703*** 0.25 0.154 0.112 0.484** 0.235 
Location (ref=rest of the 
UK)                 
    London -0.440** 0.222 -0.421 0.391 -0.277* 0.15 0.508 0.342 
   South East 0.195 0.206 0.108 0.311 0.047 0.15 -0.145 0.326 
Sector (ref= community 
and personal services)                 
   Agriculture 0.495 0.326 1.037** 0.453 0.00332 0.22 0.474 0.427 
   Manufacturing -0.488 0.332 0.429 0.432 -0.22 0.247 -0.335 0.452 
   Construction -0.409 0.326 0.661 0.513 -0.277 0.205 0.423 0.428 
   Services -0.305 0.284 0.338 0.334 -0.452** 0.187 -0.276 0.373 
   Real Estate -0.414 0.311 0.704* 0.409 -0.274 0.213 0.138 0.376 
Legal (sole proprietorships 
==1) 0.0549 0.183 0.257 0.281 0.0157 0.124 -0.304 0.302 
Wave (ref==2011)                 
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  2012 0.227 0.21 -0.0468 0.29 -0.136 0.122 -0.0431 0.273 
  2013 -0.0923 0.222 0.242 0.333 -0.229* 0.129 -0.379 0.284 
  2014 0.513 0.333 1.042* 0.546 -0.36 0.256 -0.41 0.557 
Constant 0.402 0.521 -1.938** 0.771  0.725**  0.330  0.516  0.67  
Observations 1228   416   3312   491   
p 0.0  0   0   0.00363   
Summer's D 72%   58%   77%   68%   





Aldrich, H.E. & Auster, E., 1986. Even dwarfs started small: Liabilities of age and size 
and their strategic implications. Research in organizational behavior, (8), pp.165–
198. 
BDRC Continental, 2014. Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor: Waves 
1-11, 2011-2013. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6888-9 
[Accessed May 29, 2015]. 
BDRC Continental, 2015. SME Finance Monitor Q4 2014: An independent report by 
BDRC Continental, Feb 2015. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Singer, D., 2013. Is small beautiful? Financial structure, 
size and access to finance. World Development, 52, pp.19–33. 
Bennett, R.J., Bratton, W.A. & Robson, P.J.A., 2000. Business advice: the influence of 
distance. Regional Studies, 34(9), pp.813–828. 
Bennett, R.J. & Robson, P.J.A., 2000. The use and impact of business advice by SMEs in 
Britain: an empirical assessment using logit and ordered logit models. Applied 
Economics, (32), p.1675± 1688. 
Bennett, R.J. & Robson, P.J.A., 1999. The use of external business advice by SMEs in 
Britain. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 11(2), pp.155–180. 
Berger, A.N. & Black, L.K., 2011. Bank size, lending technologies, and small business 
finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(3), pp.724–735. 
Berger, A.N., Frame, W.S. & Miller, N.H., 2005. Credit Scoring and the Availability, 
Price, and Risk of Small Business Credit. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 
37(2), pp.191–222. 
Berger, A.N. & Udell, G.F., 2006. A more complete conceptual framework for SME 
finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(11), pp.2945–2966. 
Berger, A.N. & Udell, G.F., 2003. Small Business and Debt Finance. In Z. J. Acs & D. B. 
Audretsch, eds. Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research. Great Britain: Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, pp. 299–328. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/0-387-24519-7_13. 
Berger, A.N. & Udell, G.F., 1998. The economics of small business finance: The roles of 
private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 22, pp.613–673. 
38 
 
Berry, A.J., Sweeting, R. & Goto, J., 2006. The effect of business advisers on the 
performance of SMEs. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 
13(1), pp.33–47. 
Bhandari, G. & Deaves, R., 2006. The Demographics of Overconfidence. Journal of 
Behavioral Finance, 7(1), pp.5–11. 
Binks, M.R. & Ennew, C.T., 1996. Growing Firms and Credit Constraint. Small Business 
Economics, (8), pp.17–25. 
Blackburn, R.A., 2016. Government, SMEs and entrepreneurship development: Policy, 
practice and challenges, Routledge.  
BMG Research, 2011. Research to understand the barriers to take up and use of business  
support. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/research-to-
understand-the-barriers-to-take-up-and-use-of-business-support. 
Bonaccio, S. & Dalal, R.S., 2006. Advice taking and decision-making: An integrative 
literature review, and implications for the organizational sciences. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101(2), pp.127–151. 
Boter, H. & Lundström, A., 2005. SME perspectives on business support services: The 
role of company size, industry and location H. Matlay, ed. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development, 12(2), pp.244–258. 
Canton, E. et al., 2013. Perceived credit constraints in the European Union. Small 
Business Economics, 41(3), pp.701–715. 
Chrisman, J.J., McMullan, E. & Hall, J., 2005. The influence of guided preparation on the 
long-term performance of new ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(6), 
pp.769–791. 
Chrisman, J.J. & McMullan, W., 2004. Outsider assistance as a knowledge resource for 
new venture survival. Journal of Small Business Management, 42(3), pp.229–244. 
Chrisman, J.J. & McMullan, W.E., 2000. A Preliminary Assessment of Outsider 
Assistance as a Knowledge Resource: The longer-term Impact of New Venture 
Counselling. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 24(3), pp.37–54. 
Collis, J. & Jarvis, R., 2002. Financial information and the management of small private 
companies. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 9(2), pp.100–
110. 
Cowling, M., Liu, W. & Ledger, A., 2012. Small business financing in the UK before and 




Cumming, D.J. & Fischer, E., 2012. Publicly funded business advisory services and 
entrepreneurial outcomes. Research Policy, 41(2), pp.467–481. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Love, I. & Maksimovic, V., 2006. Business environment and the 
incorporation decision. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(11), pp.2967–2993. 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2011. BIGGER, BETTER BUSINESS: 
Helping small firms start, grow and prosper. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32
225/11-515-bigger-better-business-helping-small-firms.pdf. 
Dyer, L.M. & Ross, C.A., 2008. SEEKING ADVICE IN A DYNAMIC AND 
COMPLEX BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: IMPACT ON THE SUCCESS OF 
SMALL FIRMS. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 2(13), pp.133–
149. 
Forbes, D.P., 2005. Are some entrepreneurs more overconfident than others? Journal of 
Business Venturing, 20(5), pp.623–640. 
Freel, M. et al., 2010. The latent demand for bank debt: characterizing “discouraged 
borrowers.” Small Business Economics, 38(4), pp.399–418. 
Freel, M.S., 2007. Are Small Innovators Credit Rationed? Small Business Economics, 
28(1), pp.23–35. 
Gooderham, P.N. et al., 2004. Accountants as Sources of Business Advice for Small 
Firms. International Small Business Journal, 22(1), pp.5–22. 
Han, L. et al., 2012. The use and impacts of bank support on UK small and medium-sized 
enterprises. International Small Business Journal. Available at: 
http://isb.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/10/0266242612455008.abstract 
[Accessed January 21, 2014]. 
Harvey, N. & Fischer, I., 1997. Taking Advice: Accepting Help, Improving Judgment, 
and Sharing Responsibility. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 70(2), pp.117–133. 
Harvey, N., Harries, C. & Fischer, I., 2000. Using Advice and Assessing Its Quality. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81(2), pp.252–273. 
Hessels, J. & Terjesen, S., 2010. Resource dependency and institutional theory 
perspectives on direct and indirect export choices. Small Business Economics, 
34(2), pp.203–220. 
Johnson, S., Webber, D.J. & Thomas, W., 2007. Which SMEs use external business 




Kent, P., 1994. Management advisory services and the financial performance of clients. 
International Small Business Journal, 12(4), pp.45–58. 
Kirschenmann, K., 2016. Credit rationing in small firm-bank relationships. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 26, pp.68–99. 
Kon, Y. & Storey, D.J., 2003. A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers. Small Business 
Economics, 21(1), pp.37–49. 
Kremp, E. & Sevestre, P., 2013. Did the crisis induce credit rationing for French SMEs? 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(10), pp.3757–3772. 
Larsson, E., Hedelin, L. & Garling, T., 2003. Influence of Expert Advice on Expansion 
Goals of Small Businesses in Rural Sweden. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 41(2), pp.205–212. 
Lee, N., Sameen, H. & Cowling, M., 2014. Access to finance for innovative SMEs since 
the financial crisis. Research Policy, 44(2), pp.370–380. 
Mason, C.M. & Harrison, R.T., 2001. “Investment Readiness”: A Critique of 
Government Proposals to Increase the Demand for Venture Capital. Regional 
Studies, 35(7), pp.663–668. 
McCann, P. & Ortega-Argilés, R., 2016. Smart specialisation, entrepreneurship and 
SMEs: issues and challenges for a results-oriented EU regional policy. Small 
Business Economics, 46(4), pp.537–552. 
McGee, J.E. & Sawyerr, O.O., 2003. Uncertainty and Information Search Activities: A 
Study of Owner-Managers of Small High-Technology Manufacturing Firms. 
Journal of Small Business Management, 41(4), pp.385–401. 
Michelacci, C. & Schivardi, F., 2013. Does Idiosyncratic Business Risk Matter for 
Growth? Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(2), pp.343–368. 
Mina, A., Lahr, H. & Hughes, A., 2013. The demand and supply of external finance for 
innovative firms. Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(4), pp.869–901. 
Mole, K., 2002. Business Advisers’ Impact on SMEs: An Agency Theory Approach. 
International Small Business Journal, 20(2), pp.139–162. 
Mole, K. et al., 2008. Differential gains from Business Link support and advice: a 
treatment effects approach. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 26(2), pp.315–334. 
Mole, K.F. & Bramley, G., 2006. Making Policy Choices in Nonfinancial Business 
Support: An International Comparison. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 24(6), pp.885–908. 
41 
 
Nitani, M. & Riding, A., 2013. Growth, R&amp;D intensity and commercial lender 
relationships. Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship, 26(2), pp.109–124. 
Orser, B.J., Riding, A.L. & Manley, K., 2006. Women entrepreneurs and financial 
capital. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(5), pp.643–665. 
Parker, S., C., 2002. DO BANKS RATION CREDIT TO NEW ENTERPRISES? AND 
SHOULD GOVERNMENT INTERVENE? Scottish Journal of Political 
Economics, 49(2), pp.162–194. 
Peltoniemi, J. & Vieru, M., 2013. Personal guarantees, loan pricing, and lending structure 
in Finnish small business loans. Journal of Small Business Management, 51(2), 
pp.235–255. 
Ramsden, M. & Bennett, R.J., 2005. The benefits of external support to SMEs: “Hard” 
versus “soft” outcomes and satisfaction levels H. Matlay, ed. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development, 12(2), pp.227–243. 
Robson, P.J.A. & Bennett, R.J., 2000. SME Growth: The Relationship with Business 
Advice and External Collaboration. Small Business Economics, 15(3), pp.193–
208. 
Robson, P.J.A., Jack, S.L. & Freel, M.S., 2008. Gender and the use of business advice: 
evidence from firms in the Scottish service sector. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 26(2), pp.292–314. 
Rostamkalaei, A. & Freel, M., 2016. The cost of growth: small firms and the pricing of 
bank loans. Small Business Economics, 46(2), pp.255–272. 
Scott, J.M. & Irwin, D., 2009. Discouraged advisees? The influence of gender, ethnicity, 
and education in the use of advice and finance by UK SMEs. Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 27(2), pp.230–245. 
Shaw, P.J.A.R. & Bennett, R.J., 1999. Central Government Support to SMEs Compared 
to Business Link, Business Connect and Business Shop and the Prospects for the 
Small Business Service. Regional Studies, 33(8), pp.779–787. 
Stiglitz, J. & Weiss, A., 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. 
The American economic review, 71(3), pp.393–410. 
Stinchcombe, A. & March, J., 1965. Social structure and organizations. Advances in 
strategic management, 17, pp.229–259. 
Storey, D.J., 2003. Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Public 
Policies. In Z. J. Acs & D. B. Audretsch, eds. Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Research. Great Britain: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 473–511. 
42 
 
Treichel, M. & Scott, J., 2006. Women-Owned businesses and access to bank credit: 
Evidence from three surveys since 1987. Venture Capital: An International 
Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 8(1), pp.51–67. 
Trevelyan, R., 2008. Optimism, overconfidence and entrepreneurial activity. 
Management Decision, 46(7), pp.986–1001. 
Vos, E. et al., 2007. The happy story of small business financing. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 31(9), pp.2648–2672. 
Westhead, P. & Storey, D.J., 1997. Financial constraints on the growth of high 
technology small firms in the United Kingdom. Applied Financial Economics, 
7(2), pp.197–201. 
Wren, C. & Storey, D.J., 2002. Evaluating the effect of soft business support upon small 
firm performance. Oxford Economic Papers, 54(2), pp.334–365. 
Xiang, D., Worthington, A.C. & Higgs, H., 2015. Discouraged finance seekers: An 
analysis of Australian small and medium-sized enterprises. International Small 
Business Journal, 33(7), pp.689–707. 
Yaniv, I., 2004. Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 93(1), pp.1–13. 
 
 
